At a glance
- Myanmar sits at the most severe end of the risk spectrum in this series: an active, fragmented civil war with the government controlling only a fraction of national territory, an internationally unrecognized post-election leadership, and foreign direct investment that has collapsed by roughly three-quarters from pre-coup levels.
- Waverley's positioning is explicit: this is not a market for conventional capital deployment.
- Where genuine investor interest exists, it should be directed toward humanitarian and earthquake-reconstruction engagement through UN or NGO channels, with any reassessment of Myanmar's classification contingent on a credible, internationally recognized resolution to the political and security crisis.
Key risks
● None recommended at conventional risk tolerances; any engagement should be treated as a narrow, specialist exception rather than a standard market-entry route
● Rare-earth and mineral supply-chain engagement, almost exclusively structured through Chinese intermediaries given conflict-zone access constraints
Myanmar enters this Gateway Guide as one of the most severe-risk markets in the Waverley series, and Waverley's assessment is that it does not currently warrant conventional capital deployment.
Where And How To Enter
Key Investment Locations
| Location / Region | Strategic Importance | Priority Sectors |
|---|---|---|
| Yangon (commercial capital) | Myanmar's largest city and principal remaining commercial hub, though foreign business presence has shrunk sharply since 2021 | Trade, limited remaining services and light manufacturing |
| Naypyidaw (capital) | Administrative seat of the State Administration Council / post-election junta government installed via the widely rejected December 2025-January 2026 election | Government administration |
| Thilawa Special Economic Zone (near Yangon) | One of the few still-functioning foreign- investment zones, retaining a reduced base of mostly Japanese-linked manufacturers | Light manufacturing, logistics |
| Kachin State rare-earth mining belt (China border) | Major source of heavy rare-earth elements feeding Chinese supply chains, located in an active conflict zone contested between the junta and the Kachin Independence Army | Rare-earth mining, cross-border mineral export to China |
| Mandalay / Sagaing region | Epicenter of the March 2025 magnitude-7.7 earthquake; reconstruction continues more than a year later amid an ongoing civil war that has hampered recovery | Earthquake reconstruction, humanitarian-linked infrastructure |
| Myawaddy / Kayin State (Thailand border) | Epicenter of Southeast Asia's cyberscam- compound crisis, subject to recurring crackdowns and mass detentions of foreign nationals | Formerly scam-compound real estate; now subject to enforcement and demolition |
| Offshore gas fields (Shwe, Zawtika, Yadana, Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea) | Myanmar's largest legacy foreign-investment assets, though major international operators including Total and Chevron have fully exited since 2021 | Offshore natural gas production (increasingly state- and regional-operator run) |
Source: Myanmar Waverley Gateway Guide, PDF page 1. Figures and dates are reproduced from the source document.
Investor Entry Routes
● None recommended at conventional risk tolerances; any engagement should be treated as a narrow, specialist exception rather than a standard market-entry route
● Humanitarian and reconstruction-linked engagement in earthquake-affected Mandalay and Sagaing, typically channeled through UN or NGO frameworks rather than direct commercial investment
● Existing Thilawa SEZ operators maintaining already-established manufacturing lines under reduced scale
● Rare-earth and mineral supply-chain engagement, almost exclusively structured through Chinese intermediaries given conflict-zone access constraints
● Offshore gas production, now dominated by state and regional (non-Western) operators following the exit of Total and Chevron
● Monitoring-only engagement pending resolution of the civil war, sanctions regime, and the legitimacy of the post-election government
Market-entry Observation
Myanmar enters this Gateway Guide as one of the most severe-risk markets in the Waverley series, and Waverley's assessment is that it does not currently warrant conventional capital deployment. Five years after the February 2021 coup, the country remains fragmented by active civil war: independent mapping as of mid-2026 puts the junta's firm territorial control at roughly 21-33% of the country, resistance forces and ethnic armed organizations at 38-42% and rising, and the remainder genuinely contested, with neither side able to deliver a decisive blow. Roughly 4.5 million people are internally displaced and the UN projects up to 16 million will need humanitarian aid in 2026.
The junta staged a multi-phase election in December 2025-January 2026 that was boycotted by major opposition forces, dismissed internationally as a sham, and held amid the ongoing conflict; junta chief Min Aung Hlaing was subsequently installed as president by the resulting pro-military parliament in April 2026, a outcome not recognized by the National Unity Government, most Western governments, or much of the international community.
The economic consequences of this are stark and measurable. Foreign direct investment collapsed from roughly $28.7 billion during the 2016-2020 civilian-government term to about $7.4 billion in 2021-2025 a 74% decline and official regime data shows FY2025-26 foreign investment of just $472.6 million, itself down further from the prior year. At least 25 major foreign companies, including Total, Chevron and Telenor, have fully exited since 2021.
Min Aung Hlaing has publicly blamed international sanctions for the investment collapse, but independent analysts note that rebuilding investor confidence would take considerable time even if a genuine political resolution were reached, which it has not been. Compounding this, the March 2025 magnitude-7.7 earthquake centered on Mandalay and Sagaing continues to burden reconstruction efforts more than a year later, hampered by the ongoing conflict, while the country's border regions remain the epicenter of Southeast Asia's cyberscam-compound crisis.
Investor Risk & Market Access
Key Entry Barriers
| Issue | Potential Impact | Possible Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Active, fragmented civil war | The junta firmly controls only an estimated 21- 33% of the country, with resistance forces and ethnic armed organizations holding 38-42% and the remainder contested; roughly 4.5 million people are internally displaced | Treat the country as a conflict zone for operational-risk purposes regardless of any single location's current calm |
| Illegitimate post-election government | The December 2025-January 2026 election was boycotted by major opposition forces and dismissed internationally as a sham; Min Aung Hlaing's installation as president by the resulting parliament is not recognized by the National Unity Government or most Western governments | Treat any government counterparty relationship as carrying significant legitimacy and sanctions- exposure risk |
| International sanctions regime | US, EU and UK sanctions targeting the junta and military-linked enterprises remain in force and are cited by Min Aung Hlaing himself as a primary barrier to foreign investment | Conduct exhaustive sanctions-compliance review before any engagement; assume continued or expanded sanctions exposure |
| Collapsed foreign investment base | FDI fell roughly 74% from 2016-2020 levels to 2021-2025 levels, with official FY2025-26 figures showing further decline to $472.6 million and at least 25 major foreign firms having fully exited since 2021 | Treat current investment flows as a lagging indicator of a still-deteriorating climate rather than a stabilizing base |
| Earthquake reconstruction burden | The March 2025 magnitude-7.7 earthquake centered on Mandalay and Sagaing continues to require reconstruction more than a year later, complicated by the ongoing civil war | Any reconstruction-linked engagement should proceed through established UN or NGO humanitarian channels rather than direct commercial structures |
| Scam-compound and trafficking crisis | Border regions, particularly Kayin State facing Thailand, remain the epicenter of Southeast Asia's cyberscam-compound crisis, with recurring mass detentions of foreign nationals | Avoid any real-estate, telecommunications or financial-services engagement in affected border regions pending resolution |
| Currency and capital controls | The kyat and Myanmar's foreign-exchange regime remain severely constrained amid the broader economic and political crisis | Assume limited to no reliable capital repatriation under current conditions |
Source: Myanmar Waverley Gateway Guide, PDF page 2. Figures and dates are reproduced from the source document.
Investor Risk Note
Waverley's assessment is that Myanmar does not currently meet the threshold for conventional capital deployment. An active, fragmented civil war leaves the internationally non-recognized post-election government in firm control of only a fraction of the country, foreign direct investment has collapsed by roughly three-quarters from its pre-coup level, and sanctions, currency controls and
an unresolved earthquake-reconstruction burden compound the risk. Any engagement should be treated as a narrow, specialist exception most plausibly humanitarian or reconstruction-linked work channeled through UN or NGO frameworks rather than a standard market-entry opportunity, pending a genuine and internationally recognized political resolution.
Market Access
Myanmar's nominal foreign-investment law and the Thilawa, Dawei and Kyaukphyu special economic zones remain formally in place, but capital repatriation is severely constrained by currency controls, international sanctions limit banking-channel access for Western investors, and the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration's own data shows foreign investment at a multi-year low.
Who Should The Investor Meet?
Institutional Landscape
| Actor | Why It Matters | Waverley Engagement Angle |
|---|---|---|
| State Administration Council / Office of "President" Min Aung Hlaing | Installed via the internationally unrecognized December 2025-January 2026 election and subsequent April 2026 parliamentary vote; controls an estimated 21-33% of national territory | Any engagement carries significant legitimacy and sanctions-exposure risk |
| Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) | Reports official foreign-investment approvals, now at $472.6 million for FY2025-26, down from the prior year | Nominal first point of contact for foreign investment, though approval does not address underlying conflict and sanctions risk |
| Central Bank of Myanmar | Manages a severely constrained foreign-exchange and capital-control regime amid the economic crisis | Monitor for any changes to currency and repatriation rules, though reliability remains low |
| Ministry of Planning and Finance | Administers nominal fiscal and investment policy under the post-election government | Relevant primarily for compliance documentation rather than genuine policy engagement |
| Thilawa SEZ Management Committee | Oversees one of the few still-functioning special economic zones, retaining a reduced base of mostly Japanese-linked manufacturers | Relevant only for investors maintaining pre- existing operations in the zone |
| Ethnic armed organizations and parallel administrations (e.g., Kachin Independence Organization, National Unity Government) | Control an estimated 38-42% of national territory and administer parallel governance structures in those areas | Relevant to understanding genuine on-the-ground control in any specific location, though not a conventional investment counterparty |
| United Nations and international humanitarian agencies | Coordinate the response to a humanitarian crisis affecting up to 16 million people projected to need aid in 2026, including earthquake recovery | Primary channel for any genuine humanitarian or reconstruction-linked engagement |
Source: Myanmar Waverley Gateway Guide, PDF page 3. Figures and dates are reproduced from the source document.
Current International Business Channels
Conventional business channels are severely degraded. What limited activity continues runs through DICA for formal approvals, the Thilawa SEZ for existing manufacturing operations, and UN or NGO frameworks for humanitarian and reconstruction work; mainstream international banking and investment-promotion channels are largely inoperative given sanctions and the collapse in foreign investment.
Investor Profile Best Suited
Not recommended for conventional investors under current conditions. Any engagement is suited only to specialist humanitarian, reconstruction or existing-operator contexts with extensive sanctions and conflict-risk expertise. Unsuited to any investor seeking standard capital repatriation, legal certainty, or physical security guarantees.
From Intelligence To Engagement
STEP 1: Confirm whether engagement is appropriate at all Given the severity of conditions, the first step is determining whether any form of engagement is advisable rather than which sector to enter.
STEP 2: If proceeding, confirm humanitarian or reconstruction framing Structure any engagement through UN or NGO humanitarian channels rather than conventional commercial investment.
STEP 3: Conduct exhaustive sanctions and legitimacy review Verify no exposure to military-linked enterprises or sanctioned individuals before any transaction.
STEP 4: Assess genuine territorial control Verify actual on-the-ground control of any specific location given the fragmented civil-war map, rather than relying on nominal jurisdiction.
STEP 5: Monitor for a genuine political resolution Treat any future engagement as contingent on a credible, internationally recognized resolution to the civil war and political crisis.
Waverley's Role
● Monitor the civil-war territorial map, the post-election government's legitimacy status, and sanctions developments
● Advise against conventional capital deployment under current conditions
● Where appropriate, facilitate connections to UN or NGO humanitarian and earthquake-reconstruction frameworks
● Flag any genuine political resolution that would warrant reassessment of Myanmar's investment classification
Investor Call To Action
Waverley Gateway's assessment is that Myanmar does not currently warrant conventional capital deployment given active civil war, an internationally unrecognized post-election government, collapsed foreign investment, and an unresolved earthquake-reconstruction burden investors with genuine humanitarian or reconstruction interests should engage through UN or NGO channels rather than direct commercial structures.
Monitor political resolution -> Reassess classification -> Humanitarian/reconstruction engagement only -> Conventional entry only after genuine resolution
Waverley Investor Intelligence & Opportunity Pipeline
No conventional near-term opportunity pipeline is identified. Limited activity continues in existing Thilawa SEZ manufacturing operations and in rare-earth and offshore-gas extraction, both increasingly dominated by Chinese and regional rather than Western operators.
Positioning
Myanmar sits at the most severe end of the risk spectrum in this series: an active, fragmented civil war with the government controlling only a fraction of national territory, an internationally unrecognized post-election leadership, and foreign direct investment that has collapsed by roughly three-quarters from pre-coup levels.
Waverley's positioning is explicit: this is not a market for conventional capital deployment. Where genuine investor interest exists, it should be directed toward humanitarian and earthquake-reconstruction engagement through UN or NGO channels, with any reassessment of Myanmar's classification contingent on a credible, internationally recognized resolution to the political and security crisis.
Selected Sources
● Mappr, "Mapped: Myanmar's Conflict Zones in 2026 — Who Controls What Five Years After the Coup," 2026
● DVB (Democratic Voice of Burma), "Min Aung Hlaing Blames Sanctions for Lack of Foreign Investment in Myanmar," July
● New Straits Times, "Final Round of Myanmar Vote Set to Seal Junta Ally's Victory," January 2026
● IANS, "Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing Elected Myanmar's President," April 2026
● Associated Press, "AP Visit to Myanmar Highlights Its Struggle to Rebuild After an Earthquake While a Civil War Rages," September 2025
About this assessment
Lord (JD) Waverley is an international trade and investment advisor, working at the intersection of business diplomacy and public policy. His work focuses on connecting commercial opportunity with trusted local partnerships, and helping businesses navigate the complexities of international trade. He has a particular interest in emerging and frontier markets.
This page reproduces the supplied Gateway Guide as searchable HTML, preserving its figures and stated dates. The downloadable PDF remains the source document; a new supplied report can update this page at the same URL.